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REMOVING THE UNFIT LAWYER
Charles F. Adams*
In my annual address to the Nebraska State Bar Association in
October, 19691 I suggested that much had been accomplished by
the organized bar to secure the continued service of competent
judges and the removal of incompetent judges and that little or
no progress had been made in the area of removing the unfit lawyer.
This problem impinges upon disciplinary procedures and the effect
of the new Code of Professional Responsibility2 which outlines the
modern concept of the obligation of a lawyer to discharge his pro-
fessional duties. Canon 6 admonishes us that "A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Competently." Ethical Consideration 6-13 re-
quires that a lawyer should strive to become and remain proficient.
Whether this admonition can be resolved within the framework of
disciplinary procedures or whether it will require an entirely differ-
ent approach has not yet been resolved. Disciplinary procedures
normally involve some conscious and deliberate act on the part of
an offending lawyer with an element of intent usually considered
to be an essential part of the transgression. Of course, there is
another area consisting of those cases which involve professional
negligence, but even here the doing of that which should not have
been done or the failure to do that which ought to have been done
does involve a considerable element of voluntary activity or inac-
tivity. Of course, not every case of professional negligence consti-
tutes a violation of the disciplinary rules of the Code and possible
proceedings for the discipline of the offending lawyer.
* Member of the Aurora, Nebraska, bar; University of Nebraska (A.B.,
1925, J.D., 1927); Past President, Nebraska State Bar Association;
Member, Special Committee of the American Bar Association to Secure
Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility; Member, Nebraska
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Discipline; Former member,
Nebraska Supreme Court Judicial Council; Fellow, American Bar
Foundation; Fellow, American College of Probate Counsel.
1 Address of the President, Charles F. Adams, October, 1969, reprinted
in NEBRASKA STATE BAR AssociATIoN PROcEEDINGs 1969, at 305; at Ap-
pendix A of this article is an excerpt of one of the chapters.
2 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969), adopted by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 12,
1969, effective January 1, 1970, adopted by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska on March 10, 1970, effective May 1, 1970 (with the exception
of DR-2-103 (D) (5)).
3 EC 6-1 states: "Because of his vital role in the legal process, a lawyer
should act with competence and proper care in representing clients.
He should strive to become and remain proficient in his practice and
should accept employment only in matters which he is or intends to
become competent to handle."
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It is recognized that a lawyer's unfitness to serve his clients may
be caused by senility, mental instability or sheer incompetence. It
has also been suggested that addiction to drugs or alcohol might
well be included among these causes. Probably the most definitive
analysis of this problem has been developed by the Special Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association on Evaluation of Disci-
plinary Enforcement. This Committee released its final draft on
"Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement" in
June, 1970, and this report was accepted by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association.4 This is the Committee headed
by the Honorable Tom C. Clark, retired Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and it is commonly referred to as the
"Clark Committee." Immediately after its action on the report and
recommendations of the Clark Committee, the House of Delegates
created a Special Committee on National Coordination of Discipli-
nary Enforcement whose commission is to bring about prompt im-
plementation of the recommendations of the Clark Committee. The
Clark Committee's report contains 36 problems suggesting concern
in this area.5
Problem 206 is entitled "Inadequate provisions for dealing with
attorneys incapacitated by reason of mental illness, senility or ad-
diction to drugs or intoxicants." It will be noted that the element
of incompetency, disassociated from the other stated causes, is not
included in the definition of the problem. Nevertheless, it consti-
tutes what appears to be the best analysis of the problem thus far
produced and does propose certain solutions within the framework
of disciplinary procedures.
It appears that only five states have made any substantial
progress in dealing with the problem of the unfit lawyer, although
the subject has been raised in a number of states (including Ne-
braska and Colorado) as worthy of study and consideration. The
statutes of the State of Georgia specify as among grounds compelling
removal of a lawyer "want of a sound mind,"7 but no evidence of
disciplinary cases based on this ground has been found. On April
29, 1963 the Supreme Court of Arizona adopted a revision to its
rules relating to the discipline of lawyers which had been pro-
4 SPECIAL CoMIITTEE ON EVALUATION or DIscIPLiNARY ENFORCEMENT,
AmVIEcAN BAR ASSOCIATIoN, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS :N DIs-
CiPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970).
5 The Chairman of the Committee is Henry L. Pitts, Esq., of Chicago,
and the project is under the direction of F. Raymond Marks, Jr., Senior
Research Attorney in the American Bar Association.
6 Appendix B.
7 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-501 (1935).
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posed by the State Bar Board of Governors. Rule 428 deals with in-
competency and sets forth grounds for suspension of a lawyer who
has been judicially declared incompetent, who has been committed
to a mental institution, who has failed to maintain such special
mental fitness as would have entitled him to admission to practice,
or who has committed any act or omission indicating mental unfit-
ness to continue the practice of law. Here again the procedure for
suspension is included within the general machinery for discipli-
nary proceedings for violations of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, adopted its Rule 603.159 on June 9, 1969, which likewise pro-
vides for suspension of a lawyer who has been judicially declared
incompetent or involuntarily committed to a hospital. The rule
further provides for special proceedings to determine the alleged
incapacity of a lawyer who has not yet been the subject of pro-
ceedings based upon the general state law with reference to mental
illness.
It is suggested that the same reasons which have caused the
several states to distinguish between criminal prosecutions and
inquisitions into the mental condition of a person should prompt
the legal profession to endeavor to solve the problem of the unfit
lawyer, other than in cases involving incompetency, in procedures
completely disassociated from enforcement of disciplinary rules of
professional responsibility. A supreme court could, by the adop-
tion of an appropriate rule, provide for the suspension of a lawyer
who had been adjudged mentally ill by action of the County Board
of Mental Health. Such a rule could also provide for the filing of
a complaint with a board of lawyers with state-wide jurisdiction to
consider charges filed against any lawyer for mental illness, senility
or addiction to drugs or alcohol. It would probably be advisable
to limit the power of such board to suspension from practice rather
than absolute disbarment. One of the hoped-for beneficial effects of
such a rule would be to induce such a lawyer to voluntarily submit
to suspension rather than have the proceedings continued with the
publicity incident thereto. This has been the effect of the provisions
in many states regarding the removal of unfit judges, for only in
rare instances have such judges insisted upon a full hearing of the
complaint. In nearly every instance judges have voluntarily retired
from the bench rather than subject themselves to the ordeal of a
hearing.
s Rule 42 is reprinted as Appendix C of this article.
9 Rule 603.15 is reprinted as Appendix D of this article.
REMOVING THE UNFIT LAWYER
It is suggested that this problem should be dealt with in the near
future because of the fact that the medical profession has success-
fully lengthened our life expectancy without a corresponding pre-
servation of our mental acuity. Until the time arrives when drugs
or therapy can preserve or restore the mental capacity of a lawyer
to successfully represent his clients, the clients certainly are en-
titled to the concern and protection of our profession.
APPENDIX A
REMOVING THE UNFIT LAWYER
Under the leadership of the organized Bar in the several states,
as well as our national organizations, much has been accomplished
to secure the continued service of competent judges and the removal
of judges who should not be permitted to remain on the bench.
Twenty-one states and Puerto Rico have enacted constitutional pro-
visions or statutes, or both, making it possible to remove the unfitjudge without resorting to the cumbersome and ineffective process
of impeachment. It has seldom been necessary to actually conduct
an adversary proceeding against such a judge for the reason that
he usually comes to the realization that a contest would be futile
and would serve only to tarnish his judicial reputation.
The experience of California during the years 1966, 1967, and
1968 is illuminating. Slightly more than 1,000 judges are within the
jurisdiction of their Commission on Judicial Qualifications. During
these three years 16 judges decided to resign or retire after pro-
ceedings were started but before any publicity had been given to
the charges against them. During this time no judge was actually
removed or retired by Court order.
On the other hand, there has been little or no progress in the
area of removing the unfit lawyer. The unfit lawyer I am talking
about is not the one who is guilty of a direct violation of our present
Canons or Ethics or our new Code of Professional Responsibility,
but the one who has become unfit to practice by reason of senility,
mental instability, or sheer incompetence. This is becoming a more
serious situation as the years go by, as our medical practitioners
have learned how to keep our physical bodies alive but have not
learned how to insure comparable mental acuity. Our doctor friends
are also concerned about this, because under present laws there is
nothing to prevent a man who graduated from medical school
twenty-five or fifty years ago and has spent his intervening years in
some other pursuit, from hanging up his shingle and announcing
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to the world that he is now engaged in the practice of medicine and
surgery. We pity the poor man or woman who would place his
or her life in the hands of such a man.
The same thing can happen to us under our present rules. There
is nothing to prevent one who has been an inactive member of the
Association for years, presumably in some other field of endeavor,
from simply paying the dues as an active member and immediately
becoming licensed to practice his profession. The problem is how
to cancel the license of the unfit lawyer and how to prevent the
unfit inactive member from attaining active status. As this situa-




Inadequate provisions for dealing with attorneys incapacitated
by reason of mental illness, senility or addiction to drugs or intoxi-
cants.
DnVMENSION
The testimony before this Committee indicates that disciplinary
agencies throughout the United States are becoming increasingly
concerned with the problem of the attorney who is incapacitated
by reason of mental illness, senility or addiction to drugs or intoxi-
cants. A statement by the chairman of a local disciplinary agency
in a large urban center is illustrative:
A second problem we have is this question of insanity, mental
incompetence, chronic alcoholism. The lawyer has not violated any
of the canons of ethics, he has gotten awfully close, close enough for
the committee, at least, and we note he should not be practicing law
because it's only going to be a matter of time before he is going to
be disbarred or suspended.
As yet there is no real remedy that we have to cope with that
situation. There should be, I submit to the members of this com-
mittee, some remedy which we as members of the bar have in
dealing with that kind of problem.
A number of states have formulated specific procedures for
suspending the attorney's right to practice during the period of
disability. Most, however, are still in the process of determining
how best to meet the problem.
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RECOiMENDATION
A court rule authorizing indefinite suspension or transfer to.
inactive status of any attorney incapacitated by mental illness,
senility or addiction to drugs or intoxicants until such time as the
incapacity no longer exists.
Discussion
Two factors probably are principally responsible for the profes-
sion's failure to deal adequately with the problem of incapacitated
attorneys. First, the traditional concern of disciplinary agencies
has been attorney misconduct, and an attorney who had not yet
engaged in any active misconduct, although he was incapacitated,
was considered outside the agency's jurisdiction. The chairman of
a state bar association disciplinary agency explained:
We have for consideration another problem, and that involves a
lawyer who is notoriously unfit to practice law, because of psychi-
atric problems, senility, alcoholism, and we run into them once in
a while. No offense may have been committed thus far, other than
general incompetency, and we have no jurisdiction over that. I do
not know what the answer is, but I think it is a problem that should
be considered. •
The counsel to a local disciplinary agency testified concerning
this problem:
This state has no procedure for dealing with mentally disabled
attorneys except in the context of a standard disciplinary proceed-
ing. If charges of misconduct are preferred against an attorney, and
in the course of a proceeding it is established that his conduct was
due to an existing mental condition, the courts have entered orders
of indefinite suspension authorizing an application for reinstatement
upon proper proof of rehabilitation.
This procedure, however, is not wholly satisfactory. It does not
touch the attorney who may be mentally disabled but has not yet
engaged in misconduct and permits him to remain a danger to the
public until that danger has materialized. Moreover, the institution
of a standard disciplinary proceeding against an attorney alleged to
be mentally disabled raises serious due process problems.
In many jurisdictions an attorney has been proceeded against
for his misconduct without regard to the underlying disability. He
has been disbarred, although the misconduct was the result of a
condition beyond his control and there is the possibility of rehabili-
tation (see Annotation, 96 A.L.R. 2d 739).
The second factor responsible for the profession's delay in
meeting the problem of the incapacitated attorney has been its
reluctance to deprive brother attorneys, who often have no inde-
pendent income or pension, of their means of earning a livelihood.
This attitude was expressed by the past president of a state bar:
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In the area of incompetency, I know of lawyers who are alco-
holics; I know of lawyers who are too ill to practice; I know of
lawyers who are senile; I know occasionally of a negligent lawyer.
What do you do with a lawyer who has lost his marbles but needs
the practice of law and the few clients that come in? What do you
do with this lawyer? Do you take his license away when he is 65
years old?
Quite understandably, the profession has been particularly re-
luctant to take appropriate action when there was no evidence that
the attorney had been guilty of misconduct. By contrast, the pro-
fession has been a vigorous advocate of effective measures to remove
the disabled judge, with respect to whom there is usually no prob-
lem as to income. The president of a local bar association in one of
the larger urban areas testified:
I would like to point out in the case of a member of the judi-
ciary, he probably has retirement income assured, whereas, in the
case of members of the bar, it is very likely just the reverse. You
are going to force a man to retire. Are you also going to furnish
him something on which to live during his retirement? It is this
that lies behind the whole problem-depriving the man of his live-
lihood.
These inhibiting factors still exist, but they are being reevalu-
ated. The profession is beginning to realize that although the disci-
plinary agency was initially established to cope with attorney mis-
conduct, its principal responsibility is to protect a public that is as
threatened by the disabled attorney as by the malefactor. The
hardship of taking away an attorney's livelihood because of a
condition beyond his control simply cannot justify the continued
exposure of the public to the danger represented by an attorney's
disability.
That is not to say that the profession should concern itself only
with removing the disabled attorney and should ignore the economic
plight that may follow. To the contrary, a profession whose sense
of responsibility prompts it to create security funds to reimburse
those victimized by its members might well create a similar fund
to protect those of its members who fall victim to illness.
PROPOSED RULE
Since an attorney who cannot properly handle his own affairs
obviously is not fit to represent others, the court rule concerning
the disabled attorney should provide for the suspension from prac-
tice of any attorney who because of mental infirmity or illness, or
"because of addiction to intoxicants or drugs, is unable or habitually
fails to perform his duties or undertakings competently, and is
unable to practice law without danger to the interests of his clients
and the public."
REMOVING THE UNFIT LAWYER
The following procedures should be considered in the formulation
of such a rule:
1. Suspension for disability should be imposed automatically by
the court having disciplinary jurisdiction upon the filing of a certifi-
cate indicating that the attorney either has been judicially declared
incompetent or has been involuntarily committed to a mental hos-
pital. In such instances, no further proceeding prior to suspension
need be had, since there already has been a judicial determination
that the attorney cannot safely be entrusted with his own affairs,
much less those of his clients.
2. Whenever the disciplinary agency contends, in the absence of
a judicial determination of incompetence or involuntary commit-
ment, that an attorney is suffering from a disability that requires
his suspension from practice, the matter should be determined in
a proceeding substantially similar to that provided for in the juris-
diction whenever an attorney is charged with misconduct. Thus,
the attorney should be served with the charge alleging his disability
and should be afforded the opportunity to be confronted by the
evidence against him, to cross-examine witnesses and to adduce
evidence in his own behalf. In order to avoid any due process
problem and in fairness to the attorney concerned, counsel should
be appointed to represent him if he himself has not retained one.
3. It is, of course, possible that the attorney and not the disci-
plinary agency will raise the contention that the attorney is dis-
abled. Thus, an attorney facing charges of misconduct may contend
that he is suffering from a disability that makes it impossible for
him to defend himself adequately. When such an admission of
disability is made by the attorney, that fact should be certified
immediately to the court having disciplinary jurisdiction and an
order entered suspending the attorney for disability. Since a claim
of disability may be fabricated to avoid the consequences of the
pending misconduct charges, the matter should be remanded to the
disciplinary agency for the institution of a proceeding to determine
the existence of the alleged disability. If the disciplinary agency
thereafter concludes that the disability in fact exists, no further
proceeding in the court should be necessary and the attorney should
remain suspended until and unless he is able to satisfy the require-
ments for reinstatement after suspension for disability. If the
disciplinary agency concludes that the claim of disability was
fabricated, it should report its conclusions, together with the reasons
therefore, to the court having disciplinary jurisdiction, which should
then make a final determination. If the court finds that the alleged
disability does not exist, the previously pending disciplinary pro-
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ceeding predicated on charges of misconduct should be resumed.
Of course, any conventional disciplinary proceeding pending at the
time an accused attorney is adjudged incompetent or is involun-
tarily committed to a mental institution should be continued.
4. In any proceeding in which the contention is made that the
attorney is now disabled or was disabled at the time of the conduct
on which the proceeding is predicated, he should be required to
submit to an examination by one or more physicians selected by
the disciplinary agency or appointed by the court. This will guaran-
tee the availability of all relevant evidence necessary to evaluate
the claim of incompetency properly.
5. Whenever an attorney against whom charges of misconduct
have been withheld or continued because of disability establishes
that he has recovered, he should not be reinstated until the charges
of misconduct have been disposed of. The relevance of the disability
to the misconduct charged should be determined by the applicable
facts and law. Thus, any disability unrelated to the misconduct
should not excuse the misconduct automatically. On the other hand,
misconduct resulting from disability should not result automatically
in denial of reinstatement.
6. Whenever an attorney who has been suspended for disability
moves for reinstatement, he should bear the burden of proof to
establish that the disability no longer exists and that he can be
permitted to resume the practice of law without endangering his
clients or the public.
7. Whenever an attorney who has been suspended for disability
applies for reinstatement, he should be required to submit to an
examination by one or more physicians selected by the disciplinary
agency or appointed by the court.
8. A claim of disability by the respondent in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding or the filing of a motion for reinstatement by an attorney
suspended for disability should be deemed to constitute a waiver
of any doctor-patient privilege existing between the attorney and
any doctor or hospital that has treated him during the period of
alleged disability, and the attorney should be required to disclose
the name of every doctor and hospital by whom he has been treated
during such disability or since his suspension.
9. Motions for reinstatement by an attorney suspended for disa-
bility should not be entertained more frequently than once a year.
This provision is necessary to protect the court having disciplinary
jurisdiction from being Inundated by motions for reinstatement
filed by mentally disabled attorneys.
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10. Although the public needs as much protection from the dis-
abled attorney as it does from the attorney guilty of misconduct,
suspension from practice for medical reasons must be clearly distin-
guished from suspension for wrongdoing. The attorney who is ill
should not be required to suffer the stigma of conventional disci-
pline. The order removing the disabled attorney from practice
should indicate clearly that the suspension is for medical rather
than disciplinary reasons. This can be accomplished by the termi-
nology "suspended on grounds of medical disability" or "transferred
to inactive status" in referring to the removal.
Rule 603.15 ofthe New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
First Department, which was adopted recently, substantially in-
corporates these recommendations.
APPENDIX C
RULE 42. EFFECT OF INCOMPETENCY OF MEWMER
42(a) Grounds for suspension. The license to practice of any
member (1) who has been judicially declared incompetent, or (2)
who is committed to an institution, pursuant to the provisions of
A.R.S. Title 36, Chapter 5, other than by voluntary admission, or
(3) who has failed to maintain such special mental fitness as would
have entitled the member to admission to the state bar in the first
instance, or (4) who has committed any act or omission either
related or unrelated to the practice of law indicating mental unfit-
ness to continue the practice of law, shall be suspended until rein-
statement by this court.
42 (b) Certification of judicial record to court. The clerks of the
superior court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of any
such judicial declaration or order of commitment to this court and
this court, upon receipt of such record, shall enter an order suspend-
ing the member from practice until reinstatement by this court.
42 (c) Suspension for mental unfitness; procedures. The license to
practice of any member who has failed to maintain such special
mental fitness as would have entitled the member to admission to
the state bar in the first instance, or who has committed any act or
omission either related or unrelated to the practice of law indicating
mental unfitness to continue the practice of law, as referred to in
Rule 29 (b), shall be suspended until reinstatement by this court.
Procedure for suspension in these instances shall follow the rules
provided for the discipline of members on other grounds except that
the member shall be represented by counsel of his own choice or
counsel appointed by the committee or the board, as the case may
be, at all stages of the proceedings.
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42 (d) Disciplinary proceedings pending incompetency. No disci-
plinary proceedings other than proceedings to suspend the license
of a member as provided in this rule shall be instituted or main-
tained against a member who has been judicially declared incompe-
ent or who has been committed to an institution pursuant to the
provisions of A.R.S. Title 36, Chapter 5, other than by voluntary
admission, until either (1) judicial restoration to competency has
occurred, or (2) a determination has been made either by the com-
mittee or the board in an appropriate proceeding after notice to the
member and appointment of counsel to represent the member, that
the member understands the nature of the charges' against him and
is competent to aid in his own defense. Upon such restoration or
determination, the proceedings shall be instituted or recommended
at the same stage where the proceedings were abated.
42(e) Certification of defense of incompetency to court. If a
member interposes the defense of his incompetency to abate any
disciplinary proceedings filed or then pending against him, the com-
mittee or the board, as the case may be, shall immediately certify
this fact to this court and upon receipt thereof, this court shall
enter an order suspending the member from practice until rein-
statement by this court.
42 (f) Submission to examination by physician. If in any pro-
ceeding under this rule the member introduces medical evidence of
his mental condition by a physician who has examined or treated
the member, the committee or the board, as the case may be, may
require the member to submit to examination by a physician chosen
by the committee or board and evidence based upon such examina-
tion may be received by the committee or the board.
APPENDIX D
603.15 PROCEEDINGS VWHERE ATTORNEY IS DECLARED INCOMPETENT OR
ALLEGATED TO BE INCAPACITATED. (a) Suspension upon judicial de-
termination of incompetency or on involuntary commitment. Where
an attorney, who is admitted to practice or has an other [sic] in this
department, has been judicially declared incompetent or involun-
tarily committed to a mental hospital, the court, upon proper proof
of the fact, shall enter an order suspending such attorney from
practice of law, effective immediately and for an indefinite period
and until the further order of the court. A copy of such order shall
be served upon such attorney, his committee, and/or director of
mental hospital in such manner as the court may direct.
(b) Proceeding to determine alleged incapacity and suspension
upon such determination.
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(1) Whenever an attorney, a bar association or other agency
authorized to investigate and prosecute disciplinary proceedings
under section 90 of the Judiciary Law, shall petition the court
to determine whether an attorney is incapacitated from continu-
ing to practice law by reason of mental infirmity or illness or
because of addiction to drugs or intoxicants, the court may take
or direct such action as it deems necessary or proper to determine
whether the attorney is so incapacitated, including examination
of the attorney by such qualified medical experts as the court
shall designate. If, upon due consideration of the matter, the
court is satisfied and concludes that the attorney is incapacitated
from continuing to practice law, it shall enter an order suspend-
ing him on the ground of such disability for an indefinite period
and until the further order of the court and any pending discipli-
nary proceedings against the attorney shall be held in abeyance.
(2) The court may provide for such notice to the respondent-
attorney of proceedings in the matter as is deemed proper and
advisable and may appoint an attorney to represent the respon-
dent if he is without adequate representation.
(c) Procedure when respondent claims disability during course
of proceeding.
(1) If, during the course of a disciplinary proceeding, the
respondent contends that he is suffering from a disability by
reason of mental infirmity or illness, or because of addiction to
drugs or intoxicants, which makes it impossible for the re-
spondent adequately to defend himself, the court thereupon shall
enter an order suspending the respondent from continuing to
practice law until a determination is made of the respondent's
capacity to continue the practice of law in a proceeding instituted
in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b) of this
section.
(2) If, in the course of a proceeding under this section or in
a disciplinary proceeding, the court shall determine that the
respondent is not incapacitated from practicing law, it shall take
such action as it deems proper and advisable including a direc-
tion for the resumption of the disciplinary proceeding against
the respondent.
(d) Appointment of attorney to protect clients' and suspended
attorney's interests.
(1) Whenever an attorney is suspended for incapacity or dis-
ability, the court, upon such notice to him as the court may
direct, may appoint an attorney or attorneys to inventory the
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files of the suspended attorney and to take such action as seems
indicated to protect the interests of his clients and for the pro-
tection of the interests of the suspended attorney.
(2) Any attorney so appointed by the court shall not be
permitted to disclose any information contained in any file so
inventoried without the consent of the client to whom such file
relates except as necessary to carry out the order of the court
which appointed the attorney to make such inventory.
(e) Reinstatement upon termination of disability.
(1) Any attorney suspended under the provisions of this
section shall be entitled to apply for reinstatement at such in-
tervals as the court may direct in the order of suspension or any
modification thereof. Such application shall be granted by the
court upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
attorney's disability has been removed and he is fit to resume
the practice of law. Upon such application, the court may take
or direct such action as it deems necessary or proper including a
determination whether the attorney's disability has been re-
moved and including a direction of an examination of the at-
torney by such qualified medical experts as the court shall desig-
nate. In its discretion, the court may direct that the expense
of such an examination shall be paid by the attorney.
(2) Where an attorney has been suspended by an order in
accordance with the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section
and thereafter, in proceedings duly taken, he has been judicially
declared to be competent, the court may dispense with further
evidence that his disability has been removed and may direct
his reinstatement upon such terms as are deemed proper and
advisable.
(f) Burden of proof. In a proceeding seeking an order of suspen-
sion under this section, the burden of proof shall rest with the
petitioner. In a proceeding seeking an order terminating a suspen-
sion under this section, the burden of proof shall rest with the
suspended attorney.
(g) Waiver of doctor-patient privilege upon application for re-
instatement. The filing of an application for reinstatement by an
attorney suspended for disability shall be deemed to constitute a
waiver of any doctor-patient privilege existing between the at-
torney and any psychiatrist, psychologist, physician or hospital who
or which has examined or treated the attorney during the period of
his disability. The attorney shall be required to disclose the name
of every psychiatrist, psychologist, physician and hospital by whom
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or at which the attorney has been examined or treated since his
suspension and he shall furnish to the court written consent to each
to divulge such information and records as requested.by court ap-
pointed medical experts or by the clerk of the court.
(h) Payment of expenses of proceedings.
(1) The necessary costs and disbursements of the petitioner
in conducting a proceeding under this section shall be paid in
accordance with subdivision (6) of section 90 of the Judiciary
Law.
(2) The court may fix the compensation to be paid to any
attorney or medical expert appointed by the court under this
section. This compensation may be directed by the court to be
paid as an incident to the costs of the proceeding in which the
charges are incurred and shall be charged in accordance with
law.
